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build(deps): bump certifi from 2023.7.22 to 2024.7.4 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #26

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@dependabot dependabot bot commented on behalf of github Jul 6, 2024

Bumps certifi from 2023.7.22 to 2024.7.4.

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Bumps [certifi](https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi) from 2023.7.22 to 2024.7.4.
- [Commits](certifi/python-certifi@2023.07.22...2024.07.04)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: certifi
  dependency-type: direct:production
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <[email protected]>
@dependabot dependabot bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Jul 6, 2024
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 18, 2024
Syzkaller reported this warning:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #26
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
 Code: 24 12 4c 89 e2 5b 48 c7 c7 98 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 d1 18 17 ff 4c 89 e6 5b 48 c7 c7 d0 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 bf 18 17 ff 0f 0b eb 83 <0f> 0b eb 97 0f 0b eb 87 0f 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bd90 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffff88810b172a90 RCX: 0000000000000007
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000300 RDI: ffff88810b172a00
 RBP: ffff88810b172a00 R08: ffff888104273c00 R09: 0000000000100007
 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88810b172a00
 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888237c31f78
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007ffc63fecac8 CR3: 000000000342e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __warn+0x88/0x130
  ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
  ? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0
  ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
  ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
  ? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
  __sk_destruct+0x2a/0x200
  rcu_do_batch+0x1aa/0x530
  ? rcu_do_batch+0x13b/0x530
  rcu_core+0x159/0x2f0
  handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x2b0
  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
  run_ksoftirqd+0x25/0x30
  smpboot_thread_fn+0xdd/0x1d0
  kthread+0xd3/0x100
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Its possible that two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv()/sk_forward_alloc_add()
concurrently when sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN with sk->sk_lock unlocked,
which triggers a data-race around sk->sk_forward_alloc:
tcp_v6_rcv
    tcp_v6_do_rcv
        skb_clone_and_charge_r
            sk_rmem_schedule
                __sk_mem_schedule
                    sk_forward_alloc_add()
            skb_set_owner_r
                sk_mem_charge
                    sk_forward_alloc_add()
        __kfree_skb
            skb_release_all
                skb_release_head_state
                    sock_rfree
                        sk_mem_uncharge
                            sk_forward_alloc_add()
                            sk_mem_reclaim
                                // set local var reclaimable
                                __sk_mem_reclaim
                                    sk_forward_alloc_add()

In this syzkaller testcase, two threads call
tcp_v6_do_rcv() with skb->truesize=768, the sk_forward_alloc changes like
this:
 (cpu 1)             | (cpu 2)             | sk_forward_alloc
 ...                 | ...                 | 0
 __sk_mem_schedule() |                     | +4096 = 4096
                     | __sk_mem_schedule() | +4096 = 8192
 sk_mem_charge()     |                     | -768  = 7424
                     | sk_mem_charge()     | -768  = 6656
 ...                 |    ...              |
 sk_mem_uncharge()   |                     | +768  = 7424
 reclaimable=7424    |                     |
                     | sk_mem_uncharge()   | +768  = 8192
                     | reclaimable=8192    |
 __sk_mem_reclaim()  |                     | -4096 = 4096
                     | __sk_mem_reclaim()  | -8192 = -4096 != 0

The skb_clone_and_charge_r() should not be called in tcp_v6_do_rcv() when
sk->sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, it happens later in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock().
Fix the same issue in dccp_v6_do_rcv().

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Fixes: e994b2f ("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2024
This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking
iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released
before calling a function that locks hdev.

[  561.670344] ======================================================
[  561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ #26 Not tainted
[  561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------
[  561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock:
[  561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
               at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth]
[  561.670405]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0},
               at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth]
[  561.670450]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  561.670452]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  561.670453]
               -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  561.670458]        lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[  561.670463]        lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[  561.670467]        bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth]
[  561.670510]        iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth]
[  561.670547]        do_accept+0x3dd/0x610
[  561.670550]        __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170
[  561.670553]        __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0
[  561.670556]        x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0
[  561.670559]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[  561.670563]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  561.670567]
               -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  561.670571]        lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[  561.670574]        lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[  561.670577]        iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth]
[  561.670617]        __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130
[  561.670620]        __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190
[  561.670623]        x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0
[  561.670626]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[  561.670629]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  561.670632]
               -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  561.670636]        __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0
[  561.670639]        lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360
[  561.670642]        lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[  561.670644]        __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0
[  561.670647]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  561.670651]        iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth]
[  561.670687]        iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth]
[  561.670722]        sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240
[  561.670725]        sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470
[  561.670727]        vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30
[  561.670731]        ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250
[  561.670733]        __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0
[  561.670736]        x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0
[  561.670738]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[  561.670741]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  561.670744]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  561.670745] Chain exists of:
&hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH

[  561.670751]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  561.670753]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  561.670754]        ----                    ----
[  561.670756]   lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH);
[  561.670758]                                lock(sk_lock
                                              AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[  561.670761]                                lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH);
[  561.670764]   lock(&hdev->lock);
[  561.670767]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: 07a9342 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Send BIG Create Sync via hci_sync")
Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
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